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Applying the Park City Principles to the
Endangered Species Act
Mark Squillace"
Historically, the protection of endangered and threatened species has
been the province of the federal government.' In recent years, however,
many states have enacted endangered species protection laws, and
expanded the mandate of state fish and wildlife management agencies to
encompass non-game species, including endangered species.2 Nonetheless,
the federal Endangered Species Act' ("ESA" or "Act") remains the focus
of endangered species protection in the United States, and since such
protection frequently implicates water resource management, it is
appropriate to ask how well the current federal regime for managing
endangered species comports with the Park City Principles.
I. BACKGROUND
The ESA establishes four key requirements: (1) the Secretary of the
Interior (Secretary)4 must list species if they meet the criteria set out in
the statute;5 (2) all federal agencies must conserve listed species;6 (3) all
federal agencies must consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) on actions which may adversely affect listed species"; and (4) no
* The author is the Winston S. Howard Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming
College of Law. He holds a B.S. degree from Michigan State University and a J.D. degree from the
University of Utah College of Law.
1. The history of federal wildlife regulation is reviewed in DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO tTS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 19-35 (1989); see
also MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 10-12 (2d ed. 1983).
2. For example, California prohibits the importation, taking, possession or sale of any species
determined by the Fish and Game Commission to be endangered or rare, except under specified
circumstances. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2052 (West 1984). For a review of state wildlife laws see
RUTH S. MUSGRAVE & MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK (1993).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
4. While the ESA vests the listing responsibility in the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary
is required to list marine species on the request of the Secretary of Commerce. Decisions to de-list
marine species, or downgrade their status from "endangered" to "threatened," are made on the rec-
ommendation of the Secretary of Commerce with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior. 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
6. Id. § 1536(a)(1); see also id. § 1533(f).
7. Id. § 1536(a)(2). In the case of marine species, consultation occurs with the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service.
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person may take a listed species without the prior approval of the FWS.8
Each of these processes is described in detail below as a prelude to con-
sidering how well the Endangered Species Act reflects the management
framework suggested by the Park City Principles.
A. Listing of Endangered or Threatened Species
The process for listing species as "endangered" 9 or "threatened"" is
set out at section 4 of the ESA. The listing process is critical to each of
the others, since the ESA generally affords protection only to those spe-
cies which are formally listed."
In deciding whether to list a species, the Secretary must consider
threats to the species habitat, over-utilization of a species for commercial
or other purposes, the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms for
protecting the species, and other factors affecting its survival. 2 The deci-
sion must be made "solely on the basis of best scientific and commercial
data available." 3 Importantly, however, the ESA requires that the Secre-
tary take into account the efforts that are being made by any state, foreign
nation or political subdivision of a state or foreign nation.' 4 Thus, a state
or local governmental agency may substantially reduce the possibility of
having a species listed if it has established its own effective plan for
reducing threats to the species.
Generally, critical habitat must be designated for all listed species
on the basis of the best scientific data available. 5 "Critical habitat" is
defined in the ESA as that habitat which is "essential to the conservation
of [a threatened or endangered] species."6 Unlike the decision to list,
designation of critical habitat must also take into account economic and
8. Id. § 1538.
9. An "endangered species" is one that is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to
constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming
and overriding risk to man." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
10. A "threatened species" is one that "is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
11. The Act also affords limited protection for species which are proposed for listing, 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.10 (1995), and for certain cases where species are eligible for
listing, but which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has decided not to list because of other priori-
ties. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
13. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
16. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i)(I).
Vol. XXI
1996 PARK CITY PRINCIPLES
other relevant impacts of the designation.1" Moreover, by regulation, the
Secretary has determined that critical habitat need only be designated "to
the maximum extent prudent and determinable.""8 Unless extinction is
likely to result, the Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if
the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of designation.'9
As of February 29, 1996, the Secretary had listed 959 domestic
species and 564 foreign species. 2 The rate at which species were being
added to the list had been accelerating from an average of thirty-five to
forty each year to more than one hundred each year, as a result of a
settlement agreement signed at the end of the Bush Administration in
December of 1992.21 The listing process came to an abrupt halt, however,
in 1995 when Congress imposed a moratorium on the listing of new
species.' A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that this moratorium did not suspend the obligation of the Secretary
to list species which meet the criteria of the ESA.? Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that listing may be impractical to the extent funding
may have been eliminated.'
Currently, proposed rules are pending to list an additional 196 plants
and forty-two animal species as endangered or threatened. Eighty-four
plant and ninety-eight animal "candidate species" await preparation of
proposed rules.'
17. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
18. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1995). In Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 117
(D.D.C. 1995), the court relied on this language to sustain the decision of the Secretary not to desig-
nate critical habitat for the grizzly bear.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
20. Of the 959 domestic species, 320 domestic animals and 433 domestic plants are listed as
endangered, and 114 domestic animals and 92 domestic plants listed as threatened. A complete
"boxscore" of listed species can be found on the World-Wide-Web Home Page for the Fish and
Wildlife Service at hup:l/www.fws.gov.
21. Fund for Animals v. Lujan, Civ. No. 92-800 (D.D.C.), cited at 61 Fed. Reg. 7457
(1996).
22. Pub. L. 104-06, 109 Star. 73, 86 (1995).
23. Environmental Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 872. The court held that while the appropriations rider did not repeal the Secretary's
listing duties under the ESA, "the lack of available appropriated funds prevents the Secretary from
complying with the Act." Id.
25. 61 Fed. Reg. 7596. 7598 (1996). Until recently, the FWS had divided candidate species
into three categories. Id. Category I species were those for which sufficient information supports
listing but for which listing is precluded by other priorities. These are now what the FWS calls candi-
date species. Category H species were those about which the FWS was concerned but for which the
agency lacked adequate information to list. The agency expects to draw future candidate species from
this pool. Id. at 7597. Category Ii species were not actively under listing consideration either because
they were thought to be extinct, they were found not to qualify as distinct species, or they did not
qualify as threatened or endangered. These species are no longer considered candidates for listing. Id.
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Species (or critical habitat) may be proposed for listing or de-listing
at the initiative of the' Secretary or by petition from any interested per-
son.2 Generally, the Secretary must respond to a petition within ninety
days. One of three responses can be made: (1) that the petitioned action is
not warranted; (2) that the action is warranted in which case the Secretary
must promptly initiate the listing process by publishing a proposed rule;
or (3) that the action is warranted but precluded by other pending listing
actions.27
B. Consultation
Federal agencies are generally precluded by law from taking any
action that might jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or
adversely modify habitat designated as critical to the survival of the spe-
cies.' Although an exemption process was established by Congress in
1982, exemptions are rarely granted.29 In order to implement this provi-
sion, the ESA establishes a process for "consultation" between the action
agency and the FWS.30
Whenever a federal agency proposes to take an action, it must re-
quest information from the FWS as to whether listed species, or species
proposed for listing may be present within the action area.3 If such spe-
cies are not present, the action is allowed to proceed.32 If, however, a
listed species is or may be present, the action agency must prepare a
biological assessment to ascertain whether the species or its critical habitat
are likely to be adversely affected by the proposed action.33
If adverse impacts are likely, consultation with the FWS is required.
This results in preparation of a biological opinion in which the FWS
determines whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B). Professor Houck has argued that the "warranted but preclud-
ed" category has become a "black hole for unlisted endangered species," citing evidence that it is
used with increasing frequency and that species frequently languish in this category for many years.
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation By the U.S. Department of
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 286 (1993).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
29. JACKSON B. BATTLE Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: NEPA AND THE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES AC" 206-07 (2d ed. 1994).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
31. Id. § 1536(c).
32. Id. § 1536(a)(3).
33. Id. § 1536(c)(1). For species proposed for listing, a separate "conference" process is estab-
lished by regulation for such species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.10 (1995).
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modification of its critical habitat.' If no jeopardy or adverse habitat
modification will result, the action may proceed. If no jeopardy will result
but species may be "taken" within the meaning of section 9 of the ESA,
then FWS may issue an incidental take statement which allows the inci-
dental "taking" of a specified number of species without running afoul of
section 9.3
If FWS determines that jeopardy will result then it must suggest
reasonable and prudent alternatives that will not jeopardize the species.36
Generally, actions which may jeopardize a listed species, or which will
result in the destruction or adverse modification of their critical habitat
may not go forward unless an exemption is received. As suggested above,
the exemption process is cumbersome, and exemptions are difficult to
obtain. In particular, an exemption may not be granted unless five mem-
bers of a high level, seven-person committee37 find that: (1) there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action; (2) the benefits
of the action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action
which would not jeopardize the species; (3) the action is of regional or
national significance; and (4) neither the federal agency involved nor the
exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources with respect to the proposed action.3
Generally, a biological assessment must be completed within 180
days from its inception.39 Formal consultation must generally be complet-
ed within ninety days from its initiation.'
Despite its importance, public involvement in the ESA consultation
process is generally limited because of the strict timetables established by
federal regulation for preparing the various reports required by the ESA.
Public involvement, however, on issues concerning endangered species
34. An applicant may also request early consultation, "to reduce the likelihood of conflicts
between listed species ... and proposed actions . . . . " 50 C.F.R. § 402.11 (1995). Informal consul-
tation is an optional process to assist the action agency in deciding whether formal consultation is
necessary. Id. § 402.13(a). During informal consultation, the FWS may be able to suggest modifica-
tions to a proposed project that will avoid adverse impacts to protected species, and thus the need to
engage in formal consultation. Id. § 402.13(b).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1538. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
37. Id. § 1536(e)(5). The committee includes the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of the
Army; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Administrator of the EPA; the Secre-
tary of the Interior; and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Id. § 1536(e)(3). The committee is sometimes called the "God Squad" because its essential role is to
decide the fate of a listed species.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h).
39. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(i) (1995).
40. Id. § 402.14(e).
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can usually be accommodated through the process established under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which invariably occurs
concomitantly with consultation. Typically, the action agency's biological
assessment is incorporated into the relevant NEPA document. Indeed, the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, which implement
NEPA, specifically require agencies "[t]o the fullest extent possible, [to]
prepare draft environmental impact statements concurrently with environ-
mental impact analyses and related surveys and studies required by...
the Endangered Species Act . and other environmental review laws.""'
C. Conservation
The ESA defines "conservation" as "the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threat-
ened species back to the point at which the measures provided [under the
ESA] are no longer necessary."42 Conservation obligations are specifically
imposed under three separate provisions of the statute. First, the Act
requires the Secretary to "issue such regulations as he deems necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of [listed] species."' Sec-
ond, the Act imposes an affirmative duty on all federal agencies "to
conserve [all] endangered species and threatened species"' and to "utilize
their authorities [in consultation with . . . the Secretary] by carrying our
programs for the conservation of [listed] species."' Finally, and most
concretely, the Act requires the Secretary to "develop and implement"
recovery plans for all listed species "unless he finds that such a plan will
not promote the conservation of the species."'
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (1995).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
43. Id. § 1533(d).
44. Id. § 1531(c)(1). Although this provision has been held to impose "substantial and continu-
ing obligations," Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989), the precise
scope of these obligations has never been clearly defined. See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1990); Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 261 (9th Cir 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985);
Conner v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). Among other things, these plans must include "objective, measur-
able criteria which, when met, would result in a determination ... that the species be removed from
the list." Id. § 1533(f)(l)(B)(ii). See also Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. at 117, wherein the court affirmed in




Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful to import, export, possess,
sell, deliver, transport or ship in interstate commerce any endangered
species of fish or wildlife.47 In addition, no person may "take" such
species. The ESA defines the word "take" broadly to mean "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct."' The Secretary may impose
similar restrictions against "takings" of threatened species by regulation,
and the Secretary has generally done so, although the rules relating to
particular species must generally be consulted to understand the full scope
of such takings prohibitions.49
Listed plant species are not generally subject to the takings prohibi-
tions under the ESA, although other restrictions on harming listed plant
species may apply. For example, the ESA makes it unlawful for any
person to import into or export from the United States a listed plant spe-
cies.' Further, the Act prohibits removal and possession of listed plant
species from federal lands, and the malicious damage or destruction of
such species on federal landsA'
Although the "takings" prohibitions can be onerous, the ESA incor-
porates provisions that allow limited takings of listed species without risk
of violating the law. Under section 10 of the ESA, any person who pro-
poses an activity which may "incidentally" result in the "taking" of a
listed species may prepare and seek approval of a habitat conservation
plan (HCP). 2 The HCP must describe the impact that will likely result
from the taking, the steps that will be taken to minimize and mitigate that
impact, the funding that will be available to carry out the mitigation, and
the alternatives to the proposed plan that were considered. The Secretary
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2418 (1995), the Supreme Court sustained the Secretary of the Interior's
definition of "harm" as used in the definition of "take" to mean "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding,
or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
49. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1994). For example, the rules on American alligators allow the
taking of such animals in accordance with the law and regulations of the appropriate state, subject to
certain conditions. Id. § 17.42(a)(2).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(A).
51. Id. § 1538(a)(2XB).
52. The World Wildlife Fund has published a detailed account of the HCP process and the
experience with the process through 1991. MICHAEL J. BEAN Er AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UN-
DER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1991).
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must approve a permit that authorizes the incidental taking of a listed
species if he finds that the applicant will minimize and mitigate the im-
pacts to the maximum extent practical, that adequate funding is available
to carry out the mitigation, and that the taking will not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of survival of the species. 3
II. APPLICATION OF PARK CITY PRINCIPLES TO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
Although the Park City Principles propose a policy framework for
water resource management, they seem readily adaptable to other aspects
of natural resource administration. The Endangered Species Act offers a
useful model for testing this thesis, because while the management of
listed species frequently impacts water resources, such management com-
monly affects other natural resources as well. The materials set forth
below seek to apply the Park City Principles to various relevant aspects of
the ESA, to describe how well the ESA, as currently construed, fits into
the policy framework established by those Principles, and to consider how
modest administrative or statutory changes to the ESA might better ac-
commodate those Principles.
A. Meaningful Legal and Administrative Recognition of Diverse Inter-
ests in Water Resource Values
The ESA reflects a congressional intent that endangered species
protection should take precedence over all other values.' Thus, at first
blush, one might assume that the ESA is poorly suited to recognizing the
diverse interests in water resource values. On closer scrutiny, however,
the ESA appears to accommodate this principle rather well.
First, the Act affords important procedural rights to all of the di-
verse water resource interests that are affected by endangered species
management. For example, the listing decision is made through informal
rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 This
process assures interested parties prior notice and the opportunity to
comment upon proposed listing decisions. Further, a decision to list a
species must include a basis and purpose statement, which generally must
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
54. As the Supreme Court noted in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174
(1978), "the language, history, and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1), (b)(4).
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respond to significant comments raised by members of the public. 6 More-
over, such listing or de-listing proceedings can be initiated by the Secre-
tary, on his own motion, or by any interested person.57
Similar procedural rights are afforded during the consultation pro-
cess. While neither the Act nor the implementing regulations specifically
allow public participation during consultation, the NEPA process, which
typically tracks consultation, assures that such opportunities are generally
available.58
The FWS regulations also work to accommodate the interests of
persons who will need federal approval for a proposed action, and who
wish to know in advance of filing a federal permit application whether the
proposed action raises conflicts with listed species. This is accomplished
through a process called "early consultation." Early consultation is car-
ried out at the initiative of a prospective applicant for federal action. 9
The procedure is essentially the same as for formal consultation, except
that the FWS issues only a preliminary biological opinion. This opinion
may later be affirmed as the final biological opinion if no significant
changes occur when the action is officially proposed., °
Agency actions for conserving listed species lend themselves less
well to procedural protections. Nonetheless, the preparation of recovery
plans, which is the most specific and important conservation action de-
scribed in the ESA, must be carried out in accordance with notice and
comment procedures.6 ' Thus, the interested public is assured an opportu-
nity to make their views known before the recovery plan is approved. For
example, when the FWS recently revised the 1982 Grizzly Bear Recovery
Plan, a draft revision was released for public comment, and eleven public
meetings were held throughout the Rocky Mountain Region and in Wash-
ington, D.C.62
56. Id.; see St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
57. Id. § 1533(b)(3). Subsection (D) of this section of the Act also allows interested persons to
petition to revise a critical habitat designation.
58. Under the CEQ rules, agencies are required to "[encourage and facilitate public involve-
ment in decisions which affect the quality of the human environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d) (1995);
see also id. § 1506.6,
59. 50 C.F.R. § 402.11(b) (1995).
60. Id. § 402.1 l(f).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(4).
62. See U.S. FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., GRIZZLY BEAR RECOVERY PLAN, 175 app. G (1993).
In Babbitn, 903 F. Supp. at 117, however, a federal district court affirmed in part and rejected in part
the 1993 Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan.
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The prohibition against "takings" of listed species is among the most
criticized in the ESA, especially as it applies to private land;63 but as
noted previously, persons who risk running afoul of this provision may
seek approval of a habitat conservation plan as a way to avoid sanctions.'
Moreover, any person who is charged with a "taking" is entitled to an
administrative hearing,65 and can contest that decision in federal court on
the grounds that the enforcement action exceeds the government's authori-
ty under the ESA, or on the grounds that the exercise of that authority
violates constitutional rights.' Thus, the Act affords specific procedural
protections to diverse interests in all important aspects.
The Act accommodates the substantive interests of diverse parties
less well than it protects their procedural interests. Indeed, as a general
proposition, the ESA prohibits activities which may jeopardize or result in
a "taking" of a listed species.67 Thus, for example, a person who wants to
develop property in a manner which would coincidentally "take" one or
more members of a listed species may not generally do so. Even here,
however, substantial flexibility exists to accommodate the reasonable
needs of private persons and public agencies. That flexibility is described
in detail below under subsection C. of this section.
The notion in the Park City Principles that diverse interests be given
"meaningful" recognition might be read to ask that the ESA go beyond
affording procedural rights and flexibility-that it allow or perhaps even
require the FWS to balance the value of preserving a listed species against
the other interests at stake. The ESA does not currently allow such a
balancing of interests. But the essential goal of the ESA-preserving
species at risk of extinction-could not be achieved if this requirement
were imposed. Moreover, experience with the ESA suggests that diverse
interests can be accommodated in almost all circumstances where such
interests may conflict with endangered species protection.8 In those rare
circumstances where diverse interests cannot be accommodated, those
interests might have to give way. But future conflicts between the ESA
63. See, e.g., S. 768, 104 Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 402,403 (1995), which propose to substantially
narrow the scope of the takings provision in the ESA.
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1539. See also BEAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 4-6.
65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1).
66. In Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989),
Richard Christy challenged an Interior Department ruling which found Christy liable for taking a
grizzly bear. Id. at 1327. Christy raised due process, equal protection, and fifth amendment takings
defenses to the charge. Id. at 1327-28. Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
each of Christy's constitutional claims on the facts presented, the Court did not close the door to such
challenges in a different factual context. Id. at 1329 n.4.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
68. Houck, supra note 27, at 279.
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and the Park City Principles can largely be avoided by working within the
framework of the ESA to promote conservation of listed species, and to
encourage state responsibility for other species at risk so that future feder-
al listings will not be necessary.
B. Holistic, "Problemshed" Approaches to Problem Solving
The ESA counts among its purposes "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species de-
pend may be conserved. "I Despite this language, however, only the
conservation requirement and the habitat conservation planning process
established under section 10 of the Act appear to offer any significant
opportunity for holistic management. Indeed, federal actions may not
jeopardize listed species nor may any person "take" a listed species of
wildlife, even if such actions might offer a more holistic approach toward
resource management.
Even the conservation requirement and the HCP provision can man-
date policies that are inconsistent with holistic management. For example,
the Act may actually require alteration of a natural ecosystem where such
alteration is best suited for conservation of a listed species-that is, bring-
ing the species back to the point where the protections of the Act are no
longer needed. Still, most experts agree that the biggest threat facing most
endangered species is loss of habitat,7" and thus, protection of natural
ecosystems through recovery plans, HCPs and the general conservation
requirement is often the single most important thing that can be done to
conserve a listed species.7
C. Flexible, Adaptable, and Predictable Policy Framework
The ESA is often criticized for being inflexible. As Professor Oliver
Houck has forcefully argued, however, this criticism is not well-found-
ed.' While the law gives top priority to listed species protection, and may
preclude actions which interfere with that objective, the available evidence
suggests that few projects which may affect endangered species are termi-
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
70. Paul R. Ehrlich, he Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, in BIODIVERSITY 21 (E.D.
Wilson ed., 1988); NAS REPORT, SCIENCE AND THE ESA (1995); Houck, supra note 27, at 296.
71. Case studies of the HCP process demonstrate the importance of planning and ecosystem
protection to the survival of listed species. BEAN Er AL., supra note 52, app.
72. "The Endangered Species Act, America's most controversial environmental law, may also
be its most misunderstood. It will be reviewed, once again, for re-authorization in 1993, on the wide-
spread reputation that its provisions are inflexible and stringently applied. The facts are otherwise."
Houck, supra note 27, at 278 (citation omitted).
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nated because of those effects." These results are not surprising given the
flexibility that is built into the Act. For example, while federal actions
may not jeopardize listed species, the law authorizes the Fish and Wildlife
Service to approve the incidental taking of individual members of those
species if such takings can be accomplished without jeopardizing the
prospects for the species' ultimate survival.' 4 Moreover, even where
jeopardy will occur, the FWS is usually able to recommend "reasonable
and prudent alternatives" to the proposed action which will not cause
jeopardy." Furthermore, exemptions from the Act are available. While
the process for obtaining an exemption is cumbersome, and the standards
for granting one strict,76 exemptions may be granted where the perceived
benefits of a proposed action clearly outweigh the costs associated with
the possible loss of a species.
Similar flexibility is built into the "takings" provisions. While it is
generally unlawful to take a listed species, the Fish and Wildlife Service
can authorize a limited taking by private persons if such takings are made
in accordance with an approved habitat conservation plan.' Furthermore,
persons who enter contracts which may adversely impact a species which
was not listed at the time of the contract, but which is subsequently listed,
may qualify for an exemption from the takings prohibitions of section 9.
7
1
D. Decentralized Authority and Accountability Within National Policy
Parameters
The Endangered Species Act establishes a national program that is,
by and large, implemented and enforced by the federal government. States
are encouraged to play a substantial role in the conservation of listed
species, however, under section 6 of the Act. Under this provision, the
Secretary is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with states
that have developed state programs for the conservation of listed species.
Some funding is available to encourage state participation in this program.
Generally, however, the states are not involved in other aspects of
the ESA. The listing process cannot practically be given to the states,
since individual state listing decisions would likely cause confusion and
73. Professor Houck puts the figure at less than 0.02% or one of every 5,000 projects. Id. at 318.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
75. See Houck, supra note 27, at 319-21. Houck surveyed 99 "jeopardy" opinions and noted
that "[ijn nearly all of these opinions, the Service found a "reasonable and prudent alternative that
allowed the project to proceed." Id. at 319-20.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p).
77. Id. § 1539(a).
78. Id. § 1539(b).
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inconsistency. In this sense, listing serves the function of setting "national
policy parameters" as outlined in the Park City Principles. Consultation,
enforcement against takings, and approval of HCPs, however, would
appear more amenable to state participation, assuming that the relevant
state agencies wish to assume this responsibility, and that they have the
necessary funding and expertise to do so. Although the ESA does not
expressly authorize the delegation of these responsibilities, neither does it
specifically preclude it, at least so long as the Secretary retains final
approval authority. Thus, it might be worthwhile for the Secretary of the
Interior to experiment with the delegation of one or more of these respon-
sibilities to the states in appropriate circumstances. By promoting greater
state involvement, the FWS can help instill a sense of ownership in the
ESA program, and can help to insure that the states are better educated as
to the flexibility built into the Act. As state agencies become better edu-
cated, affected parties will find a larger pool of experts who can assist
them in designing their actions to avoid conflicts with listed species.
Even though the states do not currently have a formal role to play in
consultation, enforcement and HCP approval, the FWS frequently involves
the relevant state agencies informally in these processes. 9 Moreover, the
ESA expressly authorizes the Secretary to enter into agreements with states
for the management and conservation of listed species.' In accordance with
this authority, for example, the development of guidelines for grizzly bear
management has been coordinated for many years by the Interagency Grizzly
Bear Committee, which includes representatives from various federal agen-
cies and the States of Idaho, Montana, Washington and Wyoming. 8
E. Emphasis on Negotiation, Market Approaches, and Performance
Standards Over Command and Control
Since the Endangered Species Act does not establish a traditional
regulatory program, the policy expressed in this principle is not entirely
relevant to this program. Nonetheless, the ESA's goal of endangered
species protection can be achieved either by seeking cooperation with
affected parties and states, by imposing inflexible and mandatory stan-
dards on them, or by employing some combination of these two models.
To be sure, the Act does impose fairly rigid standards as the ultimate
assurance that listed species will be protected. But application of those
79. Many HCPs, for example, are regional in scope and thus involve important planning issues
which must be addressed at the county or municipal government level. Indeed, local government agencies
are frequently responsible for initiating the HCP proceeding. See BEAN ET AL., supra note 52, app.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b).
81. See 50 Fed. Reg. 21,696 (1985) which briefly describes the establishment of the Committee.
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rigid standards can usually be avoided with careful planning and a will-
ingness on the part of all affected parties to address ESA issues in good
faith. For example, while consultation can be a cumbersome, expensive
and time-consuming process, the FWS regulations provide for "informal
consultation" as a means to avoid the more formal and cumbersome pro-
cess.' More than ninety-seven percent of the consultations that occur
under the ESA are of this informal variety.' Moreover, as noted previ-
ously, even where jeopardy may occur, the FWS must suggest reasonable
and prudent alternatives which will not cause jeopardy. Often such al-
ternatives will be suggested by interested parties themselves during the
NEPA review process. Likewise, persons can avoid running afoul of the
"takings" prohibitions, by seeking approval of an HCP, and assuring
adherence to it once it is approved.
The history of the ESA suggests that cooperation among affected
parties resolves virtually all of the conflicts that might otherwise arise.
While the ESA's mandatory standards do serve as a backstop for avoiding
species extinction, it has only rarely proved necessary for the FWS to
invoke these standards. Recognition of this fact could go a long way
toward assuring the continued success of the law.
F. Encouragement for State and Basin Participation in Federal Policy
Development
As noted previously, section 6(c) of the ESA authorizes the Sec-
retary to enter into cooperative agreements with states which establish and
maintain an adequate and active program for the conservation of listed
species.' Cooperative agreements offer the opportunity for the state and
federal governments to work together towards meeting the goals of the
ESA. Moreover, the ultimate ability of states and local agencies to partici-
pate in the ESA occurs at the pre-listing stage. Such entities can effective-
ly avoid the listing decision, and thus all of the protections of the Act, by
simply establishing their own program that will assure the conservation of
a candidate species.' Where states and local agencies are unwilling to
take on these responsibilities, federal control seems imperative if the
fundamental goals of the ESA are to be achieved.
82. 50 CFR § 402.13 (1995). During informal consultation, the FWS "may suggest modifica-
tions to the action" that are likely to avoid adverse impacts to a listed species or its critical habitat,
this obviating the need for formal consultation. Id. § 402.13(b).
83. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE
THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT at i, n.l 1 (1992).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(l)(A).
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CONCLUSION
Because of its reputation as an inflexible law, and because of the
limited margin for error in achieving the ESA's goals of conserving
species at risk of extinction, implementation of the ESA has sometimes
been controversial. Much of that controversy, however, seems to arise
from a misunderstanding of the law, and from the failure of affected
parties to avail themselves of the many opportunities for its flexible appli-
cation. If and when these problems are overcome, the ESA, perhaps with
some modest changes, might be seen as a model for adherence to the Park
City Principles.

